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The impact of wage determination regimes, namely, the degree of centralization of wage- 
setting institutions, has been for some time under debate in OECD countries. It was argued that 
both, centralized ('corporatist' or, more specifically, 'social corporatist')' and decentralized 
bargaining structures, as opposed to intermediate structures of negotiation, restrain wage 
increase, thus checking inflation and stimulating employment growth, in other words, that they 
are conducive to superior labour market and, eventually, economic performance (inter alia 
Calmfors and Driffil, 1988; Freeman, 1988).2 To identify bargaining structures emphasis was 
placed on some or all of: collective bargaining level and coordination; trade unions and 
employer organizations; and tripartite, consensus building institutions.3 But some studies 
discussed also the effects of bargaining structures on wage inequality.4 In particular, Rowthorn 
(1992), who analyzed the impact of centralization on labour market performance, focused in 
wage dispersion and employment, and also highlighted the role played by "solidaristic" 
bargaining;5 he suggests that also the degree of wage inequality has to be considered in 
evaluating performance. Others examined exclusively the relationship between the level of 
collective bargaining and the degree of wage dispersion: from evidence for six OECD countries 
Zweimuller and Barth (1994) concluded that bargaining structure influences the size of wage 
differentials. In what follows I explore only the second, more modest, of these two, often 
intertwined, issues: the effects of wage determination regimes on wage inequality, through the 
comparative study of seven Latin American countries. 
Categories such as 'centralization' and 'corporatism', questioned even in their application 
to OECD countries (Walsh, 1995), cannot be employed in relation to Latin American countries 
On some of the diverse meanings of 'corporaism' see Caimfors and Driffil (1988). Rowthorn (1992) 
narrows the definition to . . ."capitalist economies in which there are strong, and relatively centralized, 
employers' and workers' organizations" (:82). 'Social corporatism' was meant to refer to "the tripartite 
(business, labour, and the state) institutionalized involvement in the formulation and execution of economic and 
social policies" (Landesmann, 1992), but often is given a "consensus building" and "inequality reduction" 
connotation (for a thorough discussion see league, 1995). 
2 For a review of the evidence and some of its weaknesses, see Pohjola (1992). 
Caimfors and Driffil (1988), in their well cited paper, define 'centralization' of wage setting as .. . "the 
extent of inter-union and inter-employer cooperation in wage bargaining with the other side"; this definition 
differs from those that are based either on the level of bargaining or "the extent to which unions and employers 
join in aggregate bodies with varying powers vis-à-vis member union and employers". 
Actually, for Freeman (1988), wage dispersion is a "hard" indicator of labour market structure, and he 
uses it instead of institutional variables, but together with union density, to test the hypothesis of a relationship 
between wage setting institutions and economic performance. 
Moene and Wallerstein (1995) discuss how in Nordic countries centralized wage bargaining emerged in the 
1 930s as an attempt to control wages throughout the economy in line with prices in the sectors subject to 
international competition; they analyze also the origins and evolution of "solidaristic" bargaining in Scandinavia 
(which had been proposed in the early 1950s arguing that it was favourable to macro-economic stability and 
efficiency, and not on the grounds that it contributed to equality), and its effective role in redistributing income 
among wage earners. 
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without further clarification. 'Corporatism' in Latin America customarily has implied the notion 
of strong trade union subordination to the political party in government (with Mexican 
"corporatism" as the archetypal example), while centralization of wage setting often was 
achieved by way of severe state wage control. Further, in many Latin American countries, wage 
determination regimes experienced drastic fluctuations over time, including the recurrent banning 
of free wage bargaining between workers and employers. Comparison in the present day (mid 
1990s), after a relatively long-lasting period of free wage bargaining in all seven countries, has 
to take into consideration the substantial weight of the earlier histories of wage determination 
systems, that left their imprint on wage structures and the size of wage differentials. State 
intervention went far beyond the 'income policies' usual in Europe, in which wage control was 
part of explicit social accords that included macro-economic objectives, to directly fix wages in 
accordance with the varying economic and socio-political aims of the sector in power. Explicit 
"social pacts" through the workings of tripartite representative bodies were short-lived, and more 
often than not their decisions were of purely nominal value, never reaching the stage of effective 
implementation. Therefore, to analyze the impact of determination regimes in Latin American 
countries, the "traditional" meaning of centralization has to be replaced or redefined. And wage 
determination outcomes in countries where state intervention did not include the formal 
elimination or temporary suspension of collective negotiation - such as Colombia, Venezuela, 
Mexico or Peru - cannot be compared straightforwardly with those in Brazil, Argentina or 
Uruguay, where for a long time wages were set by governments. 
Surprisingly, within the Latin American context this topic was only seldom explored.6 
One outstanding exception is Banuri and Amadeo (1991) who, in search of more appropriate 
categories to describe wage-setting institutions in Asia and Latin America, rather than 
constructing a numerical index a la Caimfors and Driffil introduce a "qualitative taxonomy" 
(decentralized, pluralistic, polarized, and social corporatist models) of labour market institutions, 
situating all the Latin American countries they examine within the "polarized" model.7 The 
apparently simpler matter of the relationship between the institutional regime of wage 
determination and wage differentials received only occasional attention, mostly in individual 
countries. Amadeo (1993 and 1994), for instance, discussed some effects of trade union and 
collective bargaining trends in Brazil. Marshall (1995), focusing in Argentina, examined the 
impact of changes in the wage determination regime over a 20 year period, concluding that they 
6 In spite of a recent surge of studies of the impact of labour market institutions on economic performance 
in Latin America (e.g. those sponsored by the World Bank, Rama, 1995, among others), and research in 
individual countries (e.g. Amadeo, 1993 and 1994), the extent to which bargaining structures or, more 
generally, wage determination regimes might have affected labour market behaviour (the relationship between 
wage and productivity growth, employment and unemployment trends) in this region still remains a 
controversial issue open to research. 
Banun and Amadeo (1991) conclude that "there seems to be a hump-shaped relationship between labour 
market centralization and growth and stabilization performance", and highlight that "successful macro-economic 
performance" ... (is a function) of "the priority placed by governments on maintaining social peace" (:173). 
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had a marginal influence on inter-industry wage differentials. Allen and Labadie (1994) report 
Casacuberta and Cassoni's (1993) findings that in Uruguay reinstatement of collective wage 
bargaining in 1985 was followed by higher wage dispersion, and their own estimates show that 
in Chile wage differentials appear to have been sensitive to the sharp changes in wage setting 
regimes over time. 
In this paper I discuss these topics with reference to Latin American countries, focusing 
in manufacturing wages. The study deals with seven countries where manufacturing accounts for 
close to or well above 20 percent of GDP (table A, Appendix). First, the analytical framework 
is presented briefly. Second, a number of institutional factors that contribute to define "wage 
determination regimes" are examined, giving a specific meaning to the notion of degree of 
centralization of wage setting within Latin America, and an attempt is made to give scores to the 
selected countries in terms of those factors. Third, inter-industry wage differentials are analyzed, 
with a view at assessing whether the ranking of countries according to wage dispersion bears any 
resemblance to their ranking in terms of the (redefined) centralization of wage negotiation. Next, 
the relationship between changes in wage determination regimes and wage dispersion in 
individual countries is examined; special attention is paid to the behaviour of wage differentials 
before and after the legal reforms introduced in the early 1 990s to collective wage bargaining in 
Argentina, Chile, Peru and, to a minor extent, in Uruguay. On the basis of this double analysis, 
the relationship between wage setting institutions and wage inequality is succinctly discussed in 
the concluding section. 
ANALYTICAL MODEL: DETERMINATION OF WAGE DISPERSION 
The wage structure is the historical outcome of the interplay of economic and social- 
institutional factors. It is moulded by trends in productivity and profitability differentials, and 
thus in the differential "ability to pay", as well as by general labour market conditions. Relative 
pay also reflects the comparative employment structures - in terms of gender, age, seniority, 
skill or education - and the labour demandisupply relationship in each economic activity. 
Generally, changes in the wage structure are slow, and respond to the gradual repositioning of 
economic activities that results from technological, regulatory and organizational change, and the 
ensuing shifts in dynamism and leadership. Intra-industry changes will not necessarily modify 
the industry's position in the inter-industry wage ranking and, further, the size of inter- and 
intra-indusiry wage dispersion may vary without having any impact on the global ranking. 
The institutional factors that define the wage determination regime leave an imprint on 
the wage structure, as they affect the degree of wage inequality. Here, the 'wage determination 
regime' is a shorthand to describe the combination of a set of institutions: structures and degree 
of coordination of trade unions, employer associations and collective agreements; orientation of 
trade union policies; scope, nature and orientation of state wage intervention; and union rights, 
that strengthen or weaken labour organizations. 
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Traditionally, it has been considered that with the growth of the labour surplus wage 
differentials tend to widen, as the pressure of excess labour would be stronger in those activities 
and occupations where labour is more easily substitutable and trade unions weaker. It has been 
argued also that trade union intervention tends to narrow wage dispersion, not only due to the 
shared standards of reference for wage demands (such as the cost of living) hut also because 
trade unions can both rise relatively the lowest wages and check wage increases in leading 
sectors, particularly if collective bargaining is centralized - and wage agreements take into 
consideration the differential "ability to pay" across activities and firms - and unions are strong. 
But differences in productivity and profitability trends across economic activities make growing 
wage heterogeneity possible, as do the diverse industry-specific labour market situations, and in 
certain cases trade unions may contribute to consolidate, instead of moderate, such wage 
differentiation, in practice, a continuous struggle to maintain the historical wage differentials 
across industries and firms may develop with union active participation. The orientation of union 
strategies (solidaristic policies or the opposite) then is an important determinant of wage 
outcomes. 
Centralized bargaining is expected to be conducive to smaller wage differentials.8 Studies 
of OECD countries found that the centralized Nordic countries typically show lower wage 
inequality than "intermediate" countries (France, Germany or the Netherlands), and that the 
decentralized countries such as the U.S. and Canada have the highest dispersion coefficients. But 
wage dispersion is high in centralized Austria, and this was what Rowthorn (1992) took into 
account to stress the determining role of the egalitarian aims guiding bargaining in the Nordic 
countries. Besides, intermediate, industry-wide bargaining not necessarily contributes to narrow 
inter-industry wage differentials unless a centralized body with solidaristic objectives or other 
homogenizing aims influences the separate trade unions, or mechanisms of bargaining 
coordination are in place; in principle, industry-wide negotiation should only tend to reduce 
wage dispersion across firms within each individual economic activity. On the other hand, weak 
unions have been identified generally with decentralized bargaining, while centralization has 
been considered to give more leverage to the labour organizations,9 and consequently an inverse 
relationship between union strength and wage dispersion has usually been assumed. Still, 
centralized bargaining structures may coexist with powerless trade unions (or decentralization 
with strong unions), and thus union strength is an additional, independent determinant of wage 
inequality; unions may be even able to mitigate the detrimental impact of decentralized 
bargaining. 
$ The level of bargaining is but one factor contributing to define the degree of centralization of wage setting 
(as wage outcomes will be affected also inter alia by whether there are centralized institutions with worker and 
employer representation, and by the importance of coordination mechanisms); however, negotiation confined to 
one firm only is likely to be a good proxy for decentralization, as in this case coordination appears to be least 
likely to occur. 
Such association is not necessarily applicable to all situations. On the relationships between bargaining 
structures and the distribution of bargaining power, see e.g. Katz (1993). 
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State wage policy, following macro—economic and socio-political objectives (e.g. to 
control inflation; rise competitiveness in the context of export strategies; improve the situation of 
the lowest paid; favour small firms), also shapes wage inequality. The state may abstain from 
intervening in wage determination; permit, stimulate, eliminate, suspend or limit collective 
bargaining over wages; fix wage increases in absolute or percentage terms, either similar or 
diverse according to industry; orient collective bargaining by stipulating either similar or variable 
limitations; set minimum wages. Therefore, the size of wage dispersion not only is affected by 
collective wage bargaining between employers and trade unions, but also by occasional or 
repeated state interventions, much more so if governments pervasively administer wage 
determination. Unless higher wage activities are favoured deliberately by larger wage increases, 
state wage control tends to either freeze or close the wage structure by imposing limitations or 
fixing uniform wage rises. However, during the periods of state wage control some kind of 
parallel negotiation always takes place at the firm or establishment, and therefore the 
(homogenizing) state wage administration functions concomitantly with some decentralized 
bargaining, expressed in wage drifts, that favours greater heterogeneity. The final outcome of 
these two factors acting in opposite directions can only be identified empirically. 
WAGE DETERMINATION REGIMES 
To examine the wage determination regimes (as characterized above) regulating private 
sector wages'° in the countries studied I consider the structure of collective bargaining, the 
scope and nature of state intervention, and union rights. The latter, proxied by the legal 
regulations on the right to strike, is one of the determinants of union strength, that we try to 
capture also through unionization rates. The resulting partial and total country scores are in 
tables 4 and 5. 
Structure of collective bargaining 
The degree of centralization of wage setting depends crucially on the structure of 
collective bargaining. Bargaining structure, in turn, depends on the legal regime regulating 
collective bargaining, the actual mix of bargaining levels (centralized, intermediate or 
regional/industry-wide, multi employer, one firm exclusively), and the degree of coordination 
between bargaining units." The structure of negotiation, per Se, may be however insufficient to 
characterize wage setting, as the degree of centralization of worker and employer organizations 
might have an influence as well. But, on the other hand, trade union and employer centralization 
Wage determination in the public sector, often having distinct rules, is not examined in this paper. 
Coordination among bargaining levels may be implicit or explicit, or be entirety absent (see OECD, 
1994). 
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(the existence of one unique centralized trade union, or employer association) not necessarily 
suffices to achieve centralized wage determination, as they may coexist with diverse 
combinations of negotiation levels upon which the degree of control exerted by the central 
organizations is variable. 
In any case, here the analysis is confined to bargaining structure in terms of levels of 
bargaining, taking into account also the nature and operation of tripartite institutions and social 
pacts, on their own, to rank countries in terms of degree of centralization. Some evaluation, 
based on the literature, of labour'2 and employer organizations,'3 and of coordination,'4 was 
taken into consideration to understand each country's actual negotiation structure; it showed that 
bargaining level is a good proxy for bargaining structure understood in the broader sense. 
Legislation of most Latin American countries now admits simultaneous operation of 
different bargaining levels; this had been forbidden in Chile before 1991 and, still in 1993, 
despite the fact that the legal change of 1991 opened up the possibility of joint bargaining for a 
group of enterprises (multi employer negotiation), one-firm negotiation continued to rule almost 
exclusively (only 0.4 percent of all agreements in 1993 were the result of inter-firm bargaining; 
Chile, 1995). Except, then, for Chile, all the other six countries are characterized by hybrid 
12 
1 will not examine here the structure, generally vertical, of trade unions in the countries selected. There 
are similarities hut also many and complex differences in structure and functioning to deal with them just 
superficially; formal similarities in structures may hide substantial diversity in real operation, and in power 
relations. 
Employer organizations in Latin America tend to be relatively fragmented. According to Ermida Uriarte 
(1989) employers in Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay are not concentrated in one central association, 
but are in separate organizations, divided in tenns of economic sectors, that often consult each other and act in 
coordination. Normally, small and medium enterprises are not represented by the main associations (this was 
noted even in the case of Venezuela, where employer organization shows a high degree of centralization; 
Iturraspe, 1993; OIT, 1995). Also in Peru there are two independent central employer organizations, with little 
role in collective bargaining (Villavicencio RIos, 1993), and several, apart from the main central association, in 
Mexico, with little involvement in industrial relations (de Buen Unna, 1993). See also Enforme RELASUR 44 
(1995). 
14 In many Latin American countries the law regulates the articulation between bargaining levels (e.g. 
prevalence of industry-wide over firm agreements, or prevalence of the "most favourable [to the workers]" 
norm, or a combination thereof; industry-wide agreements set minimum standards, and firm agreements 
introduce modifications), but information on actual coordination (pattern bargaining, and implicit or "hidden" 
coordination) is scanty. Who represents trade unions (and employers) in decentralized bargaining might also be 
important as this could be a source of potential coordination; in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, trade union 
representation in decentralized bargaining sometimes fell on unions placed higher in the hierarchical structure, 
or the latter at least participate in negotiation; sometimes one trade union signs agreements with several firms 
(case of, e.g., the mechanics in Argentina; Goldin and Feldman, 1995); in Brazil there is evidence of higher 
employer associations participating in decentralized bargaining (Goldin and Feldman, 1995); in Mexico there is 
some centralized trade union control over decentralized bargaining (Bizberg et al., 1993). 
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models of collective bargaining. These mixed models differ nonetheless in terms of whether 
industry-wide negotiation requires a special procedure or permit (cases of Colombia, Venezuela, 
and Mexico), or the law admits different bargaining levels on an equal foot (firm, industry, 
region, country at large, etc.). In both situations, however, only the actual structure of 
negotiation (i.e. the proportion of firm versus industry-wide agreements, and of workers covered 
by each one of them) helps to identify the dominant bargaining level. 
In Venezuela, the importance of industry-wide negotiation in terms of worked covered 
varied sharply between years (as much as 77 percent in 1988 but only 19 percent in 1990, for 
instance). Only in certain years (e.g. 1988), when the Labour Ministry's annual estimates 
coincide with negotiations in leading economic sectors (oil, construction), they accounted for the 
majority of workers covered. But firm bargaining distinctly predominates in terms of share in 
total agreements (OIT, 1995). Decentralized bargaining prevails in Peru (Villavicencio Rios, 
1993); this seems to have been stimulated further by the legal changes introduced in 1991-1992 
notwithstanding the fact that in 1990 trade union federations had been allowed to negotiate 
industry wide. The prevalent model of collective relations in Colombia is decentralized 
negotiation at enterprise level (Urrea, 1993; Dombois and Pries, 1995). In Brazil, 65 percent of 
the agreements were signed at firm level in 1988 (Goldin and Feldman, 1995),16 and Amadeo 
(1993) holds that, in spite of substantial trade union centralization, the Brazilian bargaining 
model is closer to a non-synchronized system.'7 By contrast, until the end of the 1980s, 
industry-wide agreements ruled in Argentina, accounting for 96.5 percent of the workers covered 
by collective agreements in 1990 (Goldin and Feldman, 1995); in the 1990s, after the 
government stimulated through legal instruments the decentralization of collective bargaining, 
there was a clear trend for the share of firm-level negotiation to rise, but in terms of workers 
covered industry-wide agreements still continued to be the most usual form.'8 In Uruguay, 
The distribution of agreements according to bargaining level might be misleading as it could automatically 
"inflate" the share of firm agreements (simply because there are more firms than industries); anyway a growing 
or decreasing share of firm agreements over time gives some information on changes in bargaining structure, as 
does its comparative share in a cross-national analysis. 
16 However, the reverse might be true in terms of workers covered (estimates are not available). 
More specifically, Amadeo (1993) says that the central labour organizations intervened actively in 
discussing working conditions and workers' rights in the Constitution, and this could be interpreted as a sign 
that, in part, collective bargaining takes place at national level, but also that there is a mixed model of 
negotiation according to which minimum conditions are discussed centrally while firm bargaining establishes 
actual conditions. The Brazilian "hybrid" (intermediate centralization) system is characterized as a combination 
of two models, one, with growing centralization of trade unions and participation of the central organization in 
collective negotiation, and the other with decentralized and non-synchronized bargaining. 
The proportion of enterprise in total agreements rose from some 24 percent in 1989 to 67 percent in 1994 
and 56.5 percent in 1995 (data from Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social, BoleiIn de EszadIs:icas 
L.aborales, 28, 1 trimestre, 1995). 
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industry-wide agreements distinctly predominate,'9 while in Mexico the situation is less clear, 
in that while firm bargaining tends to prevail over industry-wide agreements, centralization 
through trade union federations also plays an important role.2° 
Accordingly, we have, tentatively, on one extreme Argentina and Uruguay; Mexico, 
Venezuela and Brazil in the middle; and Peru, Colombia and Chile on the other extreme, 
approximately in this order (but information is too sparse to rank accurately individual countries 
within each one of the three groups); in any case, Chile continues to be the outstanding example 
of almost exclusively one-firm bargaining. 
Centralized wage determination by tripartite bodies with participation of autonomous 
trade unions, not subordinated to the state, is rare in Latin America. Several attempts, some of 
which by the mid 1990s, at centralized tripartite determination of wages together with other 
issues ("concertaciOn") took place, among others, in Argentina, Uruguay, Brazil, Mexico and 
Venezuela, but met with little or ephemeral success, and labour's influence often was 
negligible.2' Both in Venezuela and Mexico the links between trade unions and the government 
have been strong but they are best characterized by "corporatism" in the Latin American 
version, and the tripartite institutions are very far from the representative bodies a la 
On the other hand, we find tripartite bodies at different levels of wage 
determination: in Uruguay industry-wide wage agreements are reached basically in the wage 
19 More details in Goldin and Feldman (1995). 
By the end of the 1970s Bronstein (1978) observed that although firm bargaining was the type of 
collective negotiation most widespread in Mexico, industry-wide agreements were important. According to 
Bizberg et al. (1993), there is highly centralized bargaining within those economic activities that have conirazos- 
leyes (industry-wide agreements) that define minimum conditions, and individual firms are able to make upward 
adjustments. In individual firm bargaining state intervention is high, as it is necessary to obtain state validation 
of the agreements. Further, the vertical structure of trade union organization means some centralized control 
over individual firm bargaining via the affiliated sectional unions. 
21 See Informe RELASIIR 44 on historical precedents and more recent "social pacts" in the Southern Cone 
(1995). Failed or purely formalisymbolic attempts took place in Argentina and Brazil in the 1980s. The 1984-85 
social pact in Uruguay also was short lived. In Chile, with the return to civilian government, some accords were 
reached with worker participation, but they did not include wages (only minimum wages). In Venezuela the 
attempts at social accords are of earlier origin but still with little effectiveness (011, 1995; Iturraspe, 1993); the 
tripartite commissions became thoroughly discredited after some fifteen years of existence, and labour and 
management played an insignificant role (Elmer (1993). On tripartism and the several social pacts in Mexico, 
and the weakness of workers and employers within the tripartite bodies, see de Buen Unna (1993). 
See Zapata (1989) on the Mexican case, showing the high level of trade union-state intertwining, even 
though not always through formal tripartite bodies. Pervasive government-union political exchange often meant 
that the state fixed top limits to negotiated wage increases. In Venezuela trade union subordination to the state 
was not of the same nature as in Mexico, and the interpretation stressing that labour organizations were not 
autonomous was questioned (see Elmer, 1993). 
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councils, of tripartite composition,23 and in Colombia trade unions participate in the institutions 
in charge of establishing minimum wages. 
But in several of the Latin American countries considered here, instead of centralization 
through tripartite bodies with representation of non-state-subordinated unions, the historically 
hegemonic form of centralized wage setting has been through state centralization. 
State intervention 
Direct wage control has been the most conspicuous form of state wage determination in 
Latin America, but government intervention in wage setting took many other forms, some of 
which were masked by the formal institutions operating at the time. In several countries wages 
were intermittently either directly fixed (collective bargaining suppressed or suspended) or 
administered by the state. This included imposing wage freezes (e.g. Argentina in 1976), fixing 
wage increases in absolute or percentage terms (Argentina, Brazil),24 and establishing 
limitations (tops, ranges) on wage increases in terms of, for example, productivity (Argentina 
and Peru after 1991, but also in earlier periods, and in some of the other State 
intervention tended to either freeze the pre-existing wage structure or to close wage differentials, 
notably by establishing increases in absolute terms,26 but sometimes the declared purpose has 
been instead to promote the decentralization of wage determination and greater wage 
differentiation (as we will see below this is what happened in the 1990s).27 State direct wage 
setting was generally but not exclusively associated with military regimes: in Argentina there 
was state wage control (and not for the first time)28 from 1976 until 1982 under the military 
government, but also in 1984-88, during the civilian government under Alfonsin's presidency; 
See Informe RELASUR 42 (1995). 
24 Marshall (1995); Sabdia (1993). In the case of Chile, indexation to past inflation was a government 
recommendation to the private sector (1973-79), later legislated (1979-82), but there is discussion as to its 
effectiveness (GarcIa, 1993). 
See e.g. Londoño Botero (1989) and Zapata (1989) on salary restrictions in Colombia and Mexico, 
respectively. In Uruguay the state continued to intervene in wage setting after full collective negotiation was 
reinstated in 1985 (Informe RELASUR 42, 1995), 
This happened often e.g. in Argentina (Marshall, 1980). 
2? An earlier example of government promotion of wage heterogeneity (Argentina, 1976-82), and the 
reasons accounting for its failure are discussed in Marshall (1988). 
2* See Cortds and Marshall (1994). 
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both in Brazil, from 1965 and until some time during the and Uruguay, from 1973 
and until 1985, wage control was under military rule.3° During the periods of wage control 
collective bargaining was not always entirely absent but was sporadic and without much 
significance. 
In other countries, or in those already cited hut at times of free wage bargaining, state 
validation (homologaciOn) of bilateral agreements may be required, and the government may 
make use of this requisite according to its macro-economic (e.g. control of inflation) or other 
objectives to administer wages. This was the case in Uruguay after 1985, when the government 
did not validate the agreements reached by workers and employers if the increase exceeded by 
far what it considered admissible, transforming the agreement into just a private accord 
(Rodriguez, 1993). Still in other cases, namely Mexico, tripartite institutions were considered to 
have served to instrument government wage policies, as state wage guidelines were endorsed and 
implemented by trade unions (Bizberg et a!., 1993; de Buen Unna, 1993). 
Union rights 
The right to strike is but one of the legal union rights that were devised or manipulated to 
either favour or demobilize trade unions and the effectiveness of their actions. Legal rules may 
be intended to encourage or discourage affiliation; and to empower unions by granting to one 
organization monopoly of representation and by ensuring sources of financing, or either to 
fragment the labour organization, limit access to financial resources, and restrict union formation 
imposing requisites such as minimum firm size. Conflict resolution may be made more 
favourable to the workers or not, depending on which are the arbitration and conciliation rules. I 
consider the regulations on strikes to indicate the strength of union rights. 
To classify countries in terms of the permissiveness of strike regulations prevailing in the 
1980s I examined the strictness of the requisites stipulated to declare a strike legal (regulations 
on procedure); limitations to (e.g. maximum duration permitted) and banning of the right to 
strike in public or essential services, however defined; whether it is allowed to contract 
replacement workers or not; workers' entitlement to wages during strikes; employment security 
See Sabdia (1993). Collective bargaining was permitted in theory but was negligible in practice. Wage 
policies changed from annual uniform wage adjustments between 1965 and 1979 to more frequent adjustments 
later. State direct wage setting, in different forms, continued throughout the early 1990s but now it established 
the "floor" to be raised by negotiation, mainly at firm level. 
30 Although there were some isolated agreements at that time, during the wage control period working 
conditions were unilaterally established by employers and wages were adjusted following state prescriptions. 
Late in 1983 the government confined its intervention to the minimum wage and wages of rural workers, but 
collective bargaining did not flourish as trade unions had been partially dismantled and restrictions on individual 
and union rights continued (Informe RELASUR 42, 1995). 
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of sthkers; sanctions to workers involved in illegal strikes; and rules on solidarity strikes. 
While in the early 1990s the right to strike was admitted in all the countries studied, 
actually it had been restored in Uruguay in 1985, severely restricted in Brazil until the 1988 new 
Constitution and in Chile until limitations were slightly relaxed in 1991. By contrast, at the end 
of the 1980s some constraints in so-called essential services were introduced in Argentina, and in 
Peru and to a minor extent in Colombia legislation became more restraining in the 1990s. While 
Colombia compares unfavourably with the remaining countries, the right to strike in Chile is the 
most restricted, even after the reforms: it is the only country where substitution of strikers is 
permitted (this is specifically prohibited in Argentina, Brazil after 1989, and Colombia) and 
strikers may be dismissed if the strike exceeds 60 days (in Brazil from 1989, and in Venezuela, 
the dismissal of strikers is explicitly forbidden). 
The nature of the right to strike contributes to define union strength. But actual strength 
in the private sector is difficult to gauge. Unionization rates provide only a partial view and, 
besides, estimates of unionization rates in manufacturing (for the 1980s) are at best frail (table 
B, Appendix);3' there is a "feeling" of later union decline and loss of membership, although 
estimates of unionization rates in the 1990s are even rarer than in previous years. Indeed, 
strength is not necessarily correlated with membership, as in many Latin American countries it 
rests more on political influence and "exchanges" with the government, parties' support, and 
mobilization capacity. 
Coverage of the collective agreements generally is much more widespread than union 
membership, particularly where the terms agreed collectively are legally extensive to all workers 
in the firm or industry, irrespective of trade union membership (erga omnes clause). Such is the 
case of Argentina,32 Brazil, Uruguay, Mexico and Venezuela (at least as from 1990). In 
Colombia and Chile, the latter since 1991, non-union members may enjoy the terms agreed 
collectively, at the expense of paying a fee to the union; in Colombia the possibility of 
generalization to non-union members depends on the unionization rate, as does in Peru from 
1992. Legal coverage, of course, as with all other aspects of labour laws, may differ from 
coverage in practice, depending on how effective is the enforcement of the wage rates agreed. 
The distance between legal and real coverage probably is wider in countries or industries with 
more centralized negotiation; it would be more difficult to evade, and less motives to do so, the 
terms agreed at firm level, that exclusively apply to the economic unit.33 
Generally unionization rates are calculated against the labour force as a whole, while here we are 
interested in union influence on wage earners in manufacturing. Further, figures generally sum together public 
and private sector union membership while both sectors are very distinct in this respect. 
32 But non-union members may be excluded from special benefits (table on comparative collective bargaining 
systems in the Southern Cone, Revisia de RFL4SUR, 6, 1995). 
Evidence of the extent of non compliance with wages set in collective agreements is not available. 
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INTER-INDUSTRY WAGE DISPERSION 
Two steps are followed below to examine the influence of the wage determination regime 
on the wage structure. First, wage dispersion is compared across countries. Then, an exploratory 
attempt is made to assess changes over time in individual countries that introduced reforms in 
the wage determination regime in the early 1990s. The analysis focuses in manufacturing 
the sector for which more information is available.35 
Behind the wage structure is the structure of manufacturing - which are the leading 
activities, what activities show fastest productivity growth rates and the greatest "ability to pay", 
which are the most skill-intensive, which is the degree of export versus domestic market 
orientation of each industry. The structure of manufacturing wages reflects the impact of 
economic determinants. Inter-industry wage structures are quite similar across countries (table 
1), particularly those with comparable industrial structures and advance in their industrialization 
process (as proxied by share of metal and machinery industries; table A, Appendix), cases e.g. 
of Argentina, Mexico and Brazil. In each country, the wage structure has been rather stable over 
time (table 2).36 As regression analysis is precluded by the nature of the information available, 
both similarity across coufitries and stability over time in the wage ranking facilitates the study 
of the potential impact of wage determination regimes on the size of wage differentials. 
Data are on earnings, and in this way capture any potential wage drift over state fixed or collectively 
agreed rates. 
Freeman (1988) found that in OECD countries "the pattern of cross-country wage differentials by industry 
displays much the same pattern as cross-country differentials by skill, by sex or by age" (:68). 
The correlation is lower in Argentina but this might be due to data problems, as the 1980 figures used in 
this analysis, published by UNTDO in 1988, ceased to be included in UNIDO's later similar publications. 
Marshall (1995), using data directly from national sources, found association between 1975 and 1990, as well as 
between 1982 and 1990. 
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Table 1. Comparative wagc structures in manufacturing, 1980 and 1990-i 
Selected Latin American countnes 
correlation coefficients (top, 1980; bottom, 1990-91). 
Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Uruguay Venezuela 






















































Uruguay 1.00 0.72 
0.85 
Venezuela I .00 
data on Argentina for 1980 might be not accurate, as they ceased to be published by IJNIDO after 1988 
Source: own estimates based on UN1DO, Handbook of Industrial Statistics, Vienna, 1992, 
and U.N., International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1995 (wages per employee, current dollars). 
Table 2. Wage structures in manufacturing: 
comparison over time in each country 
Selected Latin American countries 
correlation coefficients 




Brazil nd .93 
Chile .88 .90 
Colombia nd 
Mexico .51 .91 
Peru .60 .96 
Uruguay nd .73 
Venezuela nd .88 
* 1990 and 1994 
b see note a in table 1 
* data from ILO 
** data from UN/UNThO 
Sources: Own estimates on the basis of ILO, Yearbook of Labour Sialistics, 
Geneva, several years; UNIDO, Handbook of Labour Statistics, Vienna, 1988 and 




In the Latin American countries considered, the degree of wage dispersion (table 3) 
typically is larger than in European countries. Further, in comparatively centralized Latin 
American countries, such as Argentina and Mexico, the degree of wage dispersion is about 
Canada's (one example of decentralized bargaining in the OECD context) coefficient, but in 
Chile, one of the most decentralized Latin American countries, it is far higher than in 
Canada.37 One may speculate that this is related to the fact that inter-industry heterogeneity 
(basically, productivity differentials) is much higher in Latin American than in the advanced 
countries, but also that the homogenizing role of stronger unions in the latter surely is not 
negligible. 
But while dispersion coefficients are generally higher in Latin America than in advanced 
OECD couniries, the range of variation of the coefficients across countries is narrower in the 
former than in the latter: the distance, e.g. between intermediate and decentralized countries is 
much shorter in Latin America than within Europe,38 and this even though in terms of 
economic and industrial structures Latin American countries differ from each other probably 
much more than European countries do. Whether this is the result of more similar cultural and 
socio-institutional histories in Latin America (strong state intervention, little labour autonomy, 
weak union organizations), or of other factors is an interesting issue that requires investigation, 
but is beyond the scope of this study. 
Circa 1990, there is some indication of an inter-country association between degree of 
wage dispersion within manufacturing and bargaining structure (that in this "sample" of countries 
varies from intermediate to fully decentralized, the first in turn differing in whether industry- 
wide or firm agreements predominate), combined or not with the extent of state wage control 
and of union strength,39 but only iii the sense that Brazil, Chile and Peru show larger 
" The un-weighted coefficient of dispersion corresponding to the inter-industry wage structure is about .16 
in the Netherlands and Germany, .24 in Canada, .24 in Mexico, .26 in Argentina and .35 in Chile (ILO data, 
for 1993/4, with very slight differences in the industries included in each country). Rowthorn (1992) shows 
coefficients of variation (weighted by employment, not done here) for OECD countries: the U.S. and Canada's 
wage dispersion is exceeded only in Japan; Germany's and the Netherlands' are similar to France and Norway, 
and higher than Sweden, Denmark and Italy. 
38 The range of variation of the dispersion coefficient is narrow; it is narrower than in Europe (according to 
the weighted coefficients in Rowthom, 1992) even if the centralized Nordic countries are excluded. Dispersion 
is some 24 percent higher in Uruguay (intermediate) than in Chile (decentralized), while in decentralized UK it 
exceeds by over 40 percent the coefficient in intermediate countries like Germany, France or the Netherlands, 
although much less in relation to Belgium. 
There is information on four economic sectors (mining, manufacturing, construction, transportation) for a 
few countries (ILO, op. cit.) that, for 1985-6, shows greater wage dispersion in Chile (.43), followed by Peru 
(.22), than in Brazil (.14). 
Table 3. Wage dispersion in manufacturing 
Selected Latin American countries 













Argentina .31' •25b .26 •21b 41 45 .42c .36 .29' 
Brazil nd nd 31 29 .35 .41 
Chile .38 .35 20 30 .31 39 
Colombia nd nd 27 24 .25 .30 
Mexico .20 .24 34 37 .33 .35 
Peru .34 .50 rid nd .28 
Uruguay nd rid rid 29 .29 33 
Venezuela rid nd 23 25 .23 .36 
'1990 
Ii estimates based on data from national sources, earnings per hour (INDEC, Encuesta Industrial, in 
Marshall, 1995) 
see note a in table 1 
d 1983 
C 1987 
ILO: earnings per hour except Peru (per day) and Chile (per month), current prices 
UN/UNTI)O: wages per employee (current prices, in dollars) 
Sources: Own estimates on the basis of ILO, Yearbook of Labour Statistics, Geneva, several years; UNII)O, 
Handbook of Labour Statistics, Vienna, 1992 and UN, International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics, 1995. 
For 1973 and 1979, UNIDO, Handbook of Industrial Statistics, 1984. 
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Table 4. Wage determination regimes 
Selected Latin American countries, I 980s 
unionization 
rate in mfg 












Argentina 3 3 3 1 1 8 8 
Brazil 2 1' 2 1 1 6 5 
Chile 2 1 1 1 0 4 3 
Colombia 1 1 1 0 3C 3C 
Mexico 2 3 2 2 0 6 7 
Peru 3 3 1 1 0 5 5 
Uruguay 3 3b 2 1 9 9 
Venezuela 2 2 2 2 0 6 6 
Unionization: 1, low; 2, intermediate; 3, high 
Right to strike: 1, restrictive; 2, intermediate; 3, permissive 
Bargaining structure: 1, decentralized; 2, hybrid (combination firm/industry-wide), with predominance of firm 
bargaining; 3, hybrid, with industry-wide predominance 
Tripartite bodies: 1, none or ephemeral; 2, more lasting (see text) 
State wage control: 0, none or occasional; 1, pervasive (see text) 
Total score: (1) considers unionization rate and not right to strike, both indicating union strength; (2) the 
opposite. 
'considering that strike activity was on the rise during the 1980s, and that some have argued that the harshly 
restrictive strike legislation was somewhat ineffectual, the score here would be '2' 
b as from 1985; earlier it was restrictive (military regime) 
if tripartite minimum wage setting is considered, Colombia's scores would be 2, 4 and 4, respectively. 
Source: own estimates (see text). 
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Table 5. Wage determination regimes and wage dispersion 
II 
Score (1) Score (2) Wage dispersion 1990 
Uruguay 9 5 33 
Argentina 8 4 36 
Mexico 7(6) 4 35 
Venezuela 6 4 36 
Brazil 5(6) 3 41 
Colombia 3* 2' 30 
Peru 5 2 38 1987 
Chile 3(4) 2 39 
S 4 and 3, respectively, if tripartite minimum wage setting is considered 
Score (1): score 2 in table 4 (score 1, if different, in parenthesis). 
Score (2): bargaining structure including tripartite institutions. 
Sources: tables 3 and 4. 
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coefficients than Argentina, Uruguay, Mexico and Venezuela (tables 4 and 5)•40 Within each 
group, the values of the coefficients are not always consistent with the institutional differences. 
Further, Colombia stands out in that its coefficient of dispersion does not fit with its 
decentralized bargaining structure. The fact that in Colombia the proportion of firms paying 
close to the minimum wage is high, and that minimum wage policy (enacted by centralized, 
tripartite bodies) repeatedly affected the wage structure, might contribute to explain the 
anomaly.4' Such minimum wage influence on manufacturing wage differentials would not be 
present or would be negligible in the other six countries, with the exception, perhaps, of Chile 
in the 1990s, as I discuss below.42 Trade union (successful) claims for minimum wage rises 
seems to have contributed to reduce wage inequality in Colombia. The combination between a 
kind of solidaristic trade union attitude (implicit in the struggle for minimum wage increases) 
and weak, atomized labour organizations, that were unable to match minimum wage increases 
with wage rises in the leading industries, may explain this "downward" case of wage 
homogenization. 
It does not seem to be pertinent to seek for the influence of bargaining structure on wage 
dispersion in earlier years (e.g. 1973 and 1980; table 3). Notably, wage inequality was higher in 
Argentina, at that time under state wage control, than in any other country. As the countries 
moved to longer periods of uninterrupted and freer wage negotiation (Argentina from 1988; 
Brazil gaining momentum along the 1980s; Uruguay from 1985; Chile from 1979), wage 
dispersion seems to have become more closely associated with bargaining structure. In the past, 
centralized state wage control in some countries (with varying orientations), coexisting with free 
4° If instead of the (un-weighted) coefficients of variation presented in table 3 the standard deviations of log 
wages are examined, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela are repositioned slightly vis-à-vis each other. 
41 Comparing Colombia and Mexico, Bell (1995) found that while in Mexico minimum wages virtually had 
no effect on the formal sector, where wages are far above the minimum (and, further, only some 15 percent of 
firms in the three lowest wage industries were paying below 1.5 times the minimum wage), in Colombia the 
impact is more substantial as minimum and average wages are closer (and the proportion of firms paying 
unskilled wages below 1.5 times the minimum was 27.1; all industries). Minimum wage/manufacturing wage 
ratios were: Colombia (1987),.52, manufacturing unskilled wage, and .39, skilled wage; Mexico (1987),.40 
(1990:.31), manufacturing blue collar wage (Bell, 1995). 
42 The higher the proportion of industries/finns paying about the minimum wage (either because the 
minimum wage was set relatively high or because the average wage is low), the more important would be the 
narrowing effect of a rise in the minimum wage on wage inequality. An approximation to this is the ratio 
minimum wage/average wage (in manufacturing in our case) as, if the distance is very large, one may 
reasonably suspect that the proportion of firms/industries paying the minimum wage is low. In most countries, 
this ratio has fluctuated over time, sometimes sharply. Sparse data suggest that the minimum wage has the least 
incidence in Argentina. 
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bargaining in others, introduced some "distortions" that affected cross-country comparisons.43 
The comparative degrees of wage dispersion intra Latin America might he expressing also 
the influence of cross-country differences in the sizes of inter-industry productivity gaps" and 
in the (gender,45 skill, etc.) composition of employment of each industry (that at this stage it 
proved impossible to examine), as well as in their global labour market situations. While the 
latter do differ, particularly in terms of open unemployment (table B, Appendix) and 
employment trends, at first glance no relationship is apparent between relative wage dispersion 
and unemployment levels. 
Although the effects of wage setting institutions on trends in the average wage - one of 
the central issues in the international debate - is not discussed in this paper, a crucial question 
merits a brief detour: do decentralized bargaining structures mean that wages increasingly lag 
behind productivity, while industry-wide agreements ensure that workers appropriate a larger 
share of productivity gains? The instability of wage determination regimes in some countries, in 
particular the recurrent switch from state control to free or to limited negotiation, discussed 
above, hinders long-term cross-country comparisons, but in 1990-1995, in the countries 
examined in this paper, the state had a more limited intervention: governments either imposed 
restrictions to wage rises or strongly suggested wage guidelines, but in the context of 
uninterrupted free collective negotiation. A cursory glance at trends in 1990-1995 is revealing: 
of five countries for which comparable information is readily available (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, 
Mexico and Peru), only in Chile (with decentralized bargaining) labour costs rose faster than 
productivity; the largest lag of wages vis-à-vis productivity took place in Argentina (with 
industry-wide In the case of Chile, the sharp improvement in the labour market 
situation (see the reduction of unemployment as compared with the 1980s in table B, Appendix) 
and the fact that manufacturing employment rose at an annual rate of almost 6 percent in 199 1- 
93, perhaps in combination with some strengthening of labour's rights, probably is behind the 
gain in wages. The reverse occurred in Argentina, that is, manufacturing employment fell and 
unemployment expanded, while in Brazil, Mexico and Peru, with less changes in the level of 
open unemployment, manufacturing employment was declining also. This seems to suggest that 
In L.atin America, with the sharp shifts in regimes, the study of comparative dispersion in one single or a 
few years might be much less representative than in OECD counines. 
Ideally it would be necessary to confront wage and productivity differentials (as done by Marshall, 1980, 
for Argentina). 
See Rowthorn (1992) on the importance of gender composition. 
ILO estimates on productivity and labour costs (including non-wage labour costs, a function of wages) in 
manufacturing, in Panorama Laboral '95, 2 (table 3-A). But note that in Mexico the average wage 
rate of change in 1990-94 (i.e. not counting the large real wage loss of 1995) was closer, though still behind, to 
productivity growth. 
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labour market conditions play a much more determining role in relation to wage change than 
bargaining structures (and this in a way highlights on how weak are labour organizations to 
neutralize or at least moderate the "reserve army effect" in the region), but only further inquiry 
will provide more definite evidence. 
Individual country trends 
But in each country there seems to be some historical coherence between institutional 
changes in wage setting and the degree of wage dispersion, although the shifts in the ranking of 
countries not necessarily reflect this. Chile, for instance, in 1973 had showed the most 
egalitarian wage structure but jumped to have the third most heterogenous structure by 
in this lapse negotiation was forbidden and the government recommended (Garcfa, 1994) or 
decreed (Mizala and Romaguera, 1991) first partial and then full (but based on an 
underestimated inflation rate) wage indexation according to past inflation. This policy followed 
the redistributive wage policies of Allende's government (1970-73), that had raised the lowest 
wages relatively.48 In this same period wages in Colombia became somewhat less 
heterogeneous: between 1971 and 1977 there was a restrictive wage policy to control inflation 
(maximum limits to wage increases were imposed, thus leading to more wage uniformity); 
besides, from that time more concerted action was pursued by trade unions, that pressured for 
annual wage increases and standardization of minimum wages, through the pre-existing tripartite 
National Wage Council in charge of determining minimum wages.49 In the following decade. 
wage inequality intensified in Chile, now consistently with the newly sanctioned 
extremely decentralized negotiation. Wage heterogeneity also increased in Venezuela. In this 
country, prior to the 1980s, unions were involved in social pacts with the government, and the 
latter had granted or fixed wage increases, restraining in this way wage heterogeneity. But in the 
1980 such social pacts were frustrated and, further, changes in trade union strategies towards 
greater independence from the state presumably could have meant less acceptance of state wage 
guidelines; both factors could have led to greater heterogeneity in wage increases, and thereby to 
" The coefficients of dispersion provided by UNIDO for 1973 and 1979/80 (table 3) are estimated in a 
slightly different manner, and cannot be compared with my own estimates. 
For more details on wage policies in Chile, see Mizala and Romaguera (1991). Allen and Labadie's 
(1994) estimates based on ILO data describe a different picture: wage dispersion increased in 1970-73 (during 
Allende's presidency) and was at the same level approximately by 1980, after a period of declining dispersion. 
Londoño Botero (1989). 
5° Argentina's decrease in wage dispersion in this period (table 3) is not consistent with Marshall's (1995) 
estimates showing the opposite trend (but see note 36 above on UNIDO's 1980 data for Argentina). 
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a more dispersed wage structure.5' 
After 1988, when wage negotiation was allowed in Argentina, wage inequality increased 
somewhat, but in fact wage increments did not become more dispersed (Marshall, 1995). In 
Brazil, from 1979 to 1982, and sporadically also later, the government had fixed differential 
wage adjustments to inflation, to the detriment of the highest wages; at times, high wage jobs 
were left open to bilateral negotiation. By the 1990s the tendency was to confine state 
administered wage adjustments to the lowest wages, increasingly widening the wage range to be 
negotiated between workers and employers (Sabdia, 1993). Collective wage bargaining expanded 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s (with simultaneous government wage administration except for a 
very short lived period in 1989), and was accompanied by a widening of wage differentials 
(table 3)•52 In Uruguay, after a twelve-year period of government wage control, in 1985 
collective bargaining, in general and through the tripartite industry-wide wage councils, was 
reinstated, and this was followed by the opening of the wage structure as it had happened in 
Brazil and Argentina. 
The labour law reforms of the early 1990s introduced changes in collective bargaining 
legislation in some countries. In Chile multi-employer bargaining became legal as from 1991, in 
agreement with the more global turn towards enhancing worker rights after civilians replaced the 
military in government. But, as we have seen, still in 1993 such agreements represented just a 
negligible proportion of total agreements signed. Coverage was extended to all workers 
irrespective of union membership and limitations to the right to strike were somewhat relaxed. In 
Argentina and Peru, both from 1991, in the framework of economic liberalization policies,53 
decentralized bargaining was encouraged, wage mdexation was prohibited, and limitations on 
According to OfF (1995), in 1974-79 there was a fluid mechanism for concerted action (Comisión de Allo 
Nivel), with strong state predominance over employer and trade union representation. A later tripartite body 
(Consejo Nacionoi de Cosios, Precios y Salarios) created to face the early 1 980s crisis did not last long and the 
workers' central organization left it in 1982. Yet another centralized body was created in 1984, with little 
worker representation, that practically did not function. Davis and Coleman describe (1989) the reorientation of 
union strategies in the 1980s from economic to political unionism, and towards more autonomy from the state. 
52 In relation to Brazil, Amadeo (1993) argued that the role of the trade union central organization had been 
to improve relatively the situation of less organized sectors, diminishing disparities relative to a situation in 
which such organization would be absent. Comparing the period when negotiation expanded with the earlier one 
of strong state intervention, however, inter-industry wage dispersion increased (1990 versus 1980 in table 3). 
But Amadeo (1994) using a different estimate of dispersion found decreasing inequality and attributes this to 
trade union centralization in the 1980s. 
In Argentina, this took place in the framework of the stabilization plan (Plan de Convertibilidad); in 1993 
yet another decree was concerned specifically with bargaining decentralization. lii Peru, a new law on private 
investment (1991), that included regulations on wage increases, was followed by the decree of 1992 on 
industrial relations. 
23 
wage rises imposed: they were not to exceed productivity increases.M A closer link between 
wage and productivity differentials was expected to improve export competitiveness and check 
inflation. On the other hand, collective bargaining in Uruguay underwent minor reform, in that 
the government, following a few failed attempts in the same direction as from 1990," finally 
withdrew from the tripartite wage councils in 1992, after establishing wage guidelines for that 
year (Rodriguez, 1993; Informe RELASUR 42, 1995); withdrawal was intended to encourage 
bipartist bargaining in the hope of in this way fostering decentralization, considered to be more 
appropriate for competitiveness in the context of the ongoing process of regional integration. By 
1994 collective bargaining was experiencing increasing bilateralism and some decentralization, 
although still industry-wide agreements dominated (Informe RELASUR 42, 1995). Did these 
legislative reforms affect wage dispersion? 
In the literature dealing with cross-country comparisons generally the dispersion of wage 
is examined, but sometimes it would seem more appropriate to compare the dispersion of 
wage increments. This is particularly true when the impact of institutions on wage dispersion is 
analyzed within one country over time - governments fix increments, trade unions and employers 
bargain over rises. Moreover, greater dispersion of increments do not necessarily lead to a more 
unequal structure. And, even if wage increases were to be equal for all, this automatically would 
generate an increasing dispersion of wage levels. 
Marshall (1995) examined the dispersion of wage increments in Argentina, finding that 
the change in government wage policy in 1991, towards promoting decentralization and 
imposing that wage increases should be backed by productivity growth, was followed by a strong 
jump in the dispersion of wage increases (coefficient of variation of annual average wage 
increases: 1987-90, .07; 1991-93, •37);56 this, however, as there was some upward realignment 
of the lowest wages, had no correlate in the dispersion of wage levels that, on the contrary, 
decreased.57 By contrast, in the period immediately after the labour law reform in Peru, that 
encouraged further decentralization, inequality was intensified: the dispersion of both wage 
In Argentina, these guidelines gave rise to serious problems as to how productivity change should be 
estimated and interpreted (pastor expected productivity growth, etc.). 
" The earlier intention, not implemented, had been to link wage increases with productivity increases and to 
'dollarize" wages (RodrIguez, 1993). 
Marshall (1995), earnings per hour; 1990-94, .16 (ILO data, earnings per hour, between extreme years). 
" The post reform period was one of intense restructuring of manufacturing, and the repositioning of 
industries according to dynamism, in turn linked to new roles in export oriented strategies, might have been 
accompanied by changes in the pay hierarchy, but as yet this does not seem to have been the case of Argentina 
(see R 1990 and 1994 in table 2). in any case, as agreements are of different length and there is little 
synchronization, if it were possible to analyze a longer period some of the short-term diversity might end by 
being smoothed out. 
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levels and wage increments increased (coefficient of variation of wage increases: 1987-91 = .40; 
1991-94=.63). On the other hand, in Chile there was no reduction in the dispersion of wage 
increments (1986-91 = .27; 1991 -93 = .27)58 despite the fact that wider-than-one-firm agreements 
had been allowed; this is consistent with the negligible use of this opportunity of coalition 
bargaining, mentioned earlier. However, wage inequality declined: without affecting the 
dispersion of wage increases, the larger increments now benefitted low wage industries; perhaps 
it was because the general improvement of worker rights favoured the lowest wage sectors but, 
most likely, because the minimum wage readjustment policy implemented since 1990 meant that 
minimum wages increased somewhat faster than the average wage.59 Finally, in Uruguay, state 
withdrawal from negotiation, in such a short period, does not appear to have affected the degree 
of inter-industry dispersion of wage increments (the coefficients of dispersion, rather low, of 
wage increments are .135 and .138 for 1984-91 and 1991-93, respectively).60 
The above results point out that promotion of decentralized bargaining tended to lead to 
the (expected) outcome of somewhat less coordination in wage determination (although, judging 
by the more thorough study of the Argentine case [Marshall, 1995], with little indication of the 
wished-for association with differential productivity growth), but more diversity in wage change 
did not necessarily end in increased inequality in the short term. In any case, the analysis should 
be extended to a longer period, beyond the transition, to appraise how drastic the 
transformations have been and, eventually, the impact on trends in wage/productivity relations. 
CONCLUSION: BARGAINING STRUCTURE AND WAGE INEQUALITY 
The findings described suggest that, as in OECD countries, at times of free or relatively 
free collective wage bargaining in the Latin American region there is some relationship between 
wage inequality and degree of centralization of bargaining structures. One, intra-manufacturing 
wage inequality tends to be stronger in countries where decentralized negotiation prevailed 
(Chile and Peru, as well as Brazil if we agree that decentralization is prevalent in this country 
too), with the exception of Colombia, a case that we tried to account for earlier. Two, wage 
change in individual countries appears to be more heterogeneous at times of more decentralized 
bargaining (Argentina and Peru).61 
In both countries, initial and final years of each period (source: ILO data on earnings). 
See Camargo and GarcIa (1992) on minimum wage policy during 1990-92. Data on minimum and average 
wages (1990-93) are in Riveros (1996). 
600n the basis of ELO data on earnings per month, index numbers, initial and final years of each period. 
Data on wage levels are not available. 
61 But, as we have seen, such heterogeneity does not follow the anticipated pattern if wage levels, instead of 
increments, are examined in Argentina 
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This notwithstanding, some caveats are necessary. First, that in the countries where 
bargaining has normally been decentralized, it coexisted with extreme weakness if not outright 
repression of trade unions and their activities. Second, that the differences in the degree of wage 
inequality between counthes with diverse types of hybrid bargaining structures (in terms of 
whether either firm or industry-wide agreements are prevalent) are slight, and to this probably 
contributed the parallel operation of centralized bodies (however embryonic), but even more so 
the fact that often trade unions were subordinated to government objectives and guidelines, as 
well as the reiterated histories of state-centralized wage setting. Third, that only the contrast 
between trends in wage and in productivity differentials, not feasible as yet, could provide a 
basis for discussing whether trade unions, through more centralized negotiation, contributed to 
reduce wage inequality by checking wage increases in leading firms and industries or by rising 
the wages of backward sectors and enterprises. And finally, that really centralized bargaining 
structures have no illustration in Latin America. Centralized bargaining of the "Nordic" type, 
where wage increases are balanced against other macro-economic objectives including 
employment growth, are simply not present in Latin American history. As we have seen, social 
pacts have been short-lived and tended to play only a formal role, except for some very specific 
and also ephemeral experiences; recurrently they served to channel state wage directives. 
Centralization however was not entirely absent, but was achieved through strong state wage 
control, in the frame of broader economic strategies, that in certain cases contributed to reduce 
inequality although the aim of lessening wage disparities only rarely guided government policies. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A. Manufacturing share of GDP, and share of metal-machinery industries in manufacturing 
Percents (constant 1980 prices) 
% manufactunng/GDP % metal-machinery/manufacturing 
1970 1980 1990 1993 1980 1992 
Argentina 32.8 29.3 27.8 27.9 28.9 17.8' 
Brazil 32.2 33.2 27.5 26.9 24.7 19.2 
Chile 24.5 21.4 21.0 20.8 18.9 11.6 
Colombia 22.1 23.3 21.7 21.4 13.6 12.7 
Mexico 23.0 22.1 22.8 22.5 21.8 23.5 
Peru 21.4 20.2 18.9 19.3 10.8 5.1 
Uruguay 27.5 28.2 24.5 19.6 10.5 11.5 
Venezuela 17.5 18.8 20.5 19.8 13.3 11.0 
* 1990 
Source: CEPAL (ECLAC), Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean, 1994. 
Table B. Unionization rates and the labour market 
(percents) 





urban unemployment rate 
1985 1990 1995** 
Argentina 66 198246 32.6 6.1 7.5 18.6 
Brazil 34 28.0 5.3 4.3 45 
Chile 22 31.7 17.0 6.5 5.7 
Colombia 8 31.3 13.8 10.5 8.5 
Mexico 34 36.0 4.4 2.7 6.6 
Peru 54 1982a 40.4* 10.1 8.3 8.2 
Uruguay 31-72 198Th nd 13.1 9.3 10.4 
Venezuela 20 or over' 26.2 14.3 10.5 10.3 
* Non-agricultural self employed and unpaid family workers (excluding technical, administrative 
and professional workers), plus domestic service, in non-agricultural employment 
** Second quarter (Peru: third quarter; Colombia: three-quarter average); preliminary data 
'Lima 
b varies according to industry (100 percent in the oil sector); no average is available 
(Cassoni et a!.. 1994:56). 
details in OLT (1995) 
Source: Allen and Labadie (1994); J. M. Camargo and E. J. Amadeo, "Labour legislation and institutional aspects 
of the Brazilian labour market", in ReestructuraciOn y Regulacian Instizuciona! del Mercado de Trabajo en America 
Latina, Research Series 98, Geneva: filLS, 1993; A. Cassoni, 0. Labadie and S. Allen, "Reformas del mercado 
laboral ante Ia liberalizaciOn de la economia. El caso de Uruguay", BID, Documenios de Trabajo 177, Washington 
D.C., 1994; S. Feldman, "Tendencias de Ia sindicalizaciOn en Argentina", Esiudios del Trabajo, 2, 1991; Londono 
Botero (1989); OLT (1995); OfF, Panorama Laboral 2, 1996; I. Yepez del Castillo and J. Bernedo Alvarez, La 
Sindica!izacidn en el Peru, Lima: Fundación F. Ebert/Pontificia Universidad Católica, n.d.; C. Zazueta and R. de 
Ia Pefia, La Esiructura del Congreso del Trabajo: Estado, Trabajo y Capita! en Mé.xico, Mexico: Fondo de Cultura 
EconOmica, 1984. 
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